The browser checks its own DNS cache; if empty, the OS checks its resolver cache; if still empty, the OS checks the local hosts file. Only if all three miss does an actual DNS query leave the machine at all — most repeat visits to a site never get past this step.
A recursive query (UDP/53) goes to the configured resolver — an ISP resolver or a public one like 8.8.8.8. "Recursive" means the client is asking the resolver to do all the remaining work and hand back a final answer, rather than following referrals itself.
RecursiveThe recursive resolver checks its own cache first. If it already has a valid (non-expired) answer for this domain from a prior lookup by any client, it returns that immediately — no further queries needed.
Resolver CacheOn a full cache miss, the resolver performs iterative queries, each one a referral to the next level: it asks a root server ("who handles .com?"), gets referred to a TLD server, asks that ("who's authoritative for example.com?"), gets referred to the domain's authoritative name server, and finally asks that server directly for the actual A/AAAA record.
IterativeThe resolved IP (93.184.216.34) is returned to the client, and cached with its own TTL at the resolver, and then again at the OS and browser layers on the client side. Multi-layer caching — not just one cache — is exactly why this entire sequence is skipped on subsequent visits until the relevant TTLs expire.
CheckpointSYN, SYN-ACK, ACK toward 93.184.216.34:443 — the standard three-way handshake. (Covered in full depth, including what happens if the third packet never arrives, on its own dedicated sheet.)
TCPThe client sends its supported TLS versions, cipher suites, and a key share for the key exchange — plus, critically, the SNI (Server Name Indication) field stating which hostname it's trying to reach. SNI exists because a single IP often hosts many different HTTPS domains; without it, the server wouldn't know which certificate to present.
ClientHelloThe server responds with its chosen cipher suite, its key share, and its certificate chain. In TLS 1.3, the server can start encrypting the rest of the handshake immediately after this point — in TLS 1.2 several more round trips in plaintext were required first, which is the core reason 1.3 is faster.
ServerHelloThe client walks the presented certificate chain up to a trusted root CA already in its trust store, checks the certificate's validity dates, confirms the hostname matches the certificate's SAN, and checks revocation status — ideally via OCSP stapling, where the server includes a pre-fetched, signed revocation proof directly in the handshake, avoiding a separate round trip to the CA.
Cert ValidationUsing ephemeral Diffie-Hellman, both sides independently derive the same symmetric session key from the exchanged key shares — the key itself is never transmitted, only the public values needed to compute it.
Key ExchangeBoth sides send a "Finished" message — a MAC computed over the entire handshake transcript — proving neither the earlier ClientHello/ServerHello nor anything in between was tampered with in transit. From this point on, every byte is encrypted under the derived session key. The very first TLS application-data record the server sends — carrying the beginning of the HTTP response — is, literally, the "first encrypted byte" this question asks about.
First Byte| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Recursive Query | A query where the receiver is asked to fully resolve and return a final answer |
| Iterative Query | A query where the receiver may respond with a referral to another server instead of a final answer |
| Root / TLD / Authoritative | The three-tier hierarchy a recursive resolver walks to resolve a name it doesn't have cached |
| TTL | How long a DNS record may be cached before it must be re-queried |
| SNI | Server Name Indication — the hostname sent in cleartext in the ClientHello, enabling shared-IP HTTPS |
| Cipher Suite | The agreed combination of key exchange, encryption, and MAC algorithms for the TLS session |
| Certificate Chain | The path from a server's certificate up to a trusted root CA, validated at handshake time |
| OCSP Stapling | The server pre-fetching and including its own certificate's revocation proof in the handshake |
| Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman | A key exchange producing a unique session key per connection, supporting forward secrecy |
| DoH / DoT | DNS over HTTPS / DNS over TLS — encrypting the DNS query itself, separate from the TLS handshake to the site |